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ABSTRACT 
THISARTICLE DISCUSSES academic in  tolerance, peer review 
suppression, and resulting de facto academic library censorship. 
Included are some ethical considerations regarding scholarly 
communication (and scholarly excommunication), academic 
librarianship, and academic whistle-blowing. One of higher 
education’s most deeply rooted ethical tenets is a commitment to 
the search for truth. However, the truth is often upsetting (to say 
the least) to powerful academic leaders, as the history of science, 
for example, has made obvious. In tolerance toward, and suppression 
of, truthful ideas of a scholarly nature, can lead to de facto academic 
library censorship, even though academic librarians may not be aware 
that they are involved. Historically, peer review authorities in 
academia have been the enemies in intellectual matters of academic 
whistle-blowers. Ethical conflicts arise when reliance and deference 
in regard to peer review authorities lead to suppression of ideas, 
unwittingly or otherwise, by academic librarians. To the extent that 
true ideas are suppressed and censored throughout the scholarly 
communication system, that system might also accurately be called 
a system of scholarly excommunication. Without compromising their 
neutrality, academic librarians, by giving access to ideas and 
information on all sides of academic questions and controversies, 
can serve as illuminators of the truth for scholars seeking the truth. 
A proposal is made for the institution of intellectual freedom (IF) 
committees and groups within academic libraries and academic 
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library associations in order to help these librarians detect academic 
and peer review suppression. The very existence of such IF groups 
might have a salutary effect on the quality of peer review in academia. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a recent trend to regard academic libraries not only 
as separate entities serving specific institutions of higher education 
but also as mere links-and even subordinate links at that-within 
a larger system known as scholarly communication. This article is 
an introductory discussion of some of the ethical considerations and 
conflicts that might accompany the so-called information explosion 
and the enormous technological advances in the transmission of 
information among scholars. 
ACADEMIC AND ACADEMIC ETHICSETHICS LIBRARY 
Following the upheavals on many campuses during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, some recent literature on higher education has 
attempted to reaffirm, with ringing rhetoric, the principle that the 
search for the truth is the foundation of academic ethics. For example, 
Nolte (1983) asserts that the “first requirement of the academic ethic 
is the obligation of methodically striving for the truth” (p. 161). 
Likewise, in a discussion of “The Academic Ethics,” Ruegg (1986) 
maintains that “the absolute commandment of respect for the truth 
is fundamental to the exercise of scientific and scholarly professions” 
(p. 408). 
If the search for the truth in any given academic discipline is 
a basis or foundation of academic ethics, it would follow that a tenet 
of academic library ethics would be the attempt to provide the user/ 
scholar with access to material containing the truth and to provide 
such access in the most effective manner possible. Along this line, 
Meador and Buthod (1982) cite the following from the American 
Library Association’s (ALA) guidelines regarding reference service: 
“Information provided the user in response to an inquiry must be 
the most accurate possible” (p. 144). This common bond for scholars 
and librarians in regard to truth is expressed by Altick (1974) (a well- 
known English professor), in his work entitled “Librarianship and 
the Pursuit of Truth.” Altick refers to himself as “a pursuer of truth” 
and to his audience of librarians as “the dedicated custodians of truth” 
(p. 4) and also as “curators and disseminators of truth” (p. 16). He 
also lumps himself and librarians together as “devoted and in some 
instances veteran pursuers, preservers, and disseminators of truth” 
(P. 5 ) .  
340 LIBRARY TRENDUFALL 1991 
COMPUTER AND ACADEMIC VIRUSESVIRUSES LIBRARY 
Scholars pursue the truth, and academic librarians collect, store, 
and disseminate the truth. Unfortunately, this description is not a 
complete one. The pursuit of truth is often a task that proves to 
be elusive, ambiguous, and very complicated. For one reason or 
another, scholars at times end up  publishing false information, 
believing it to be true. Also, in the classroom, some false information 
is taught as if i t  were true. As a result, falsehoods, masquerading 
as truths, find their way onto academic library shelves and into library 
catalogs. 
Altick (1974) believes that “most error” has its origins “in haste 
or misunderstanding” (p. 14). But whatever the cause of error, the 
resulting falsehoods that are masquerading as truths in academic 
libraries create obstacles to scholars who are searching for the truth. 
Some recent newspaper headlines have noted sensational cases of so-
called “computer viruses” in which information systems have been 
changed by the suppression/destruction and alteration of intended 
information and by the insertion in its place of unwanted information. 
If the search for the truth is the basic tenet of academic ethics, and 
if providing scholars with access to the truth is a consequential tenet 
of academic library ethics, the intended scholarly material in the 
academic library would be that which contains the truth. It would 
follow, in such a case, that the presence of falsehood masquerading 
as truth in an academic library would amount to a form of academic 
library virus. And the greater the degree of such falsehood, the more 
severe the virus. 
Although the cases of computer viruses that have made the 
headlines have apparently been, for the most part, carefully 
programmed events designed to have specific effects, academic library 
viruses of the sort just described are ongoing phenomena that are 
constantly changing as knowledge itself changes. In fact, Altick (1974) 
observes that “the progress of knowledge consists in large part of 
proving received statements faulty, exploding myths, reordering the 
sequence of events ...” (p. 15). A possible cure for academic library 
viruses would include the library’s own selection of material that 
corrects the errors and exposes the fdsehoods. Presumably this selected 
material would already be included within the library’s holdings. 
(As will be discussed, such selection does not mean that material 
that contains errors and falsehoods should be “weeded,” although 
in some cases, as in medical libraries, “retractions” are sometimes 
issued which amount to a form of weeding.) 
So far, so good. Academic librarians help correct error, explode 
myths, and reorder sequences by selecting the latest scholarly research 
results that set the scholarly record straight. However, often scholars 
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themselves do not agree with each other on given subjects, and 
academic debates and controversies develop, sometimes becoming 
bitter and long drawn out affairs. In addition, the subject matter 
of such controversies is sometimes very highly specialized and 
technical, for which the librarian might not have very much expertise. 
How can the librarian judge what is true and what is false? And 
where would librarians ordinarily find the time to do thorough 
research for such questions? Must the academic librarian look on 
helplessly as library viruses exist and possibly spread? 
ACADEMICCONTROVERSY 
In cases of controversial issues, library ethics oblige librarians 
to make accessible all sides of a question. Davis (1982) proposes the 
following: “[Ilt is our duty to provide more information...by 
promoting discussion and insuring that the widest range of 
information and ideas possible are available” (p. 40). The academic 
librarian, by remaining neutral, can stay above the fray and does 
not need to take sides in order to provide scholars with access to 
the truth. As a collector of information, rather than an arbiter and 
judge in academic controversies, the librarian provides the scholar 
with material on all sides of a controversy. Once again there might 
be reason to say, “So far, so good.” If the librarian does not know 
the precise cure for an academic virus, he or she at least provides 
the medicine that allows the scholar to come up  with a possible 
cure. 
PEER REVIEW COMMUNICATIONAND SCHOLARLY 
It is, however, at this point that some real problems begin, and 
these are conflicts that no amount of rhetoric can hide or gloss over. 
In more general terms, Altick (1974) describes such conflicts as follows: 
“In effect, there is a sort of conflict between the persistence of the 
old and the demands of the new” (p. 13). More specifically, there 
are well-documented controversies among scholars about whether the 
truth should be accepted as truth and be disseminated and made 
widely known. There is also conflict, real and theoretical, between 
scholars and librarians, and among librarians themselves, about 
whether or not academic librarians should let the truth be known. 
Specific conflicts of such a nature often take place within the academic 
process known as peer review. These conflicts have a relationship, 
directly or indirectly, to academic library ethics. (For the purposes 
of this article, the term peer review is not considered only in its 
narrow definition of referee reports, but also in its broader definition 
of how scholars evaluate each others’ works. In this broader definition, 
a published book review is as much a part of peer review as an 
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unpublished referee’s rejection-carried out in secrecy-of a scholar’s 
manuscript.) 
As long as secrecy remains a cherished practice of so-called peer 
review authorities, accurate and reliable in-depth stuhes of peer 
review seem impossible. An attempt to make such a study would 
appear to be the equivalent of examining how successful or 
unsuccessful the operations of the CIA and KGB are without having 
access to the classified material relating to the actual operations of 
these organizations. Moreover, it seems that some recent examinations 
of peer review, such as those of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 1987-1988, the Institute of Medicine 
in 1987-1989, and the American Medcal Association (AMA) in 1989 
have been marred by conflict-of-interest situations of their own (a 
study that includes some analysis of these situations is underway 
and is planned as part of a larger hscussion of academic ethics). 
At any rate, i t  should seem obvious to everyone interested in, 
and concerned about, academic librarianship that peer review 
suppression can have a negative and stifling effect upon the academic 
librarian’s attempts at “insuring that the widest range of information 
and ideas possible are available.” To what extent does peer review 
suppression/censorship take place in academia, if at all, and if i t  
does take place, what should academic librarians do when examples 
of i t  are brought to their attention? 
Some scholars have written negatively about peer review in 
general terms. For instance, Leslie (1989) observes: “Almost everyone 
who has ever submitted anything to a journal has a horror story 
or two to tell” (p. 125). Armstrong (1982) is also highly critical: 
“Recent research shows that journal reviewing practices are neither 
objective nor fair .... Is ‘peer review’ simply a nice term for censorship? 
....Major innovations tend to refute current wisdom. From the evidence 
above, we would suspect very innovative articles to have difficulty 
gaining acceptance from major journals, particularly if they came 
from low status sources and they challenged commonly held ideas .... 
Peer review is not as fair as i t  appears. Nor is i t  helpful to scientific 
achievements” (pp. 62-63, 65, 67). And Cude (1987) suggests that, 
“scholarly tolerance for innovation-for one reason, if not another- 
i s  actually rather low” (p. 51). 
Recently, the Office of Scholarly Communication of the American 
Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) conducted a survey of more 
than 5,000 scholars. A very large number (71 percent) of those surveyed 
replied. Morton and Price (1989) describe the results: 
About three out of four respondents think the editorial peer review system 
is biased.... About 40 percent think bias is so prevalent in their discipline 
that it merits reform .... The question is, therefore, not whether bias exists 
in the peer review system, but whether it is prevalent and whether it 
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systematically interferes with the free exchange of information and ideas 
by discriminating against particular subjects, opinions, and classes of 
authors.... The survey shows that suspicions of bias appear to be held 
by scholars in all types of universities and among all the disciplines 
sampled.... The unease is pervasive, not an occasional outcropping of 
discontent. (pp. 7-9) 
(There seems to be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy to these 
results, for soon after they were released and made known, the Office 
of Scholarly Communication was closed down and its scholarly 
journal, Scholarly Communication, was discontinued.) Cude 
(personal communication, April 15, 1988) comments further about 
what he perceives as the breadth and depth of peer review suppression: 
In the name of collegiality, students are victimized, considerable 
intellectual resources are being squandered, and the general public is 
deliberately misled. Worse yet, the free pursuit of knowledge is itself 
threatened: useful information is altered or nullified, valuable arguments 
are suppressed, and highly-respected institutions are manipulated to serve 
meanly personal ends. We cannot convincingly pretend this sort of thing 
isn’t occurring on a hsmaying scale, and we only harm ourselves 
professionally by refusing to address the difficulties openly and 
vigorously. 
More than a century ago, many women were killed by childbirth 
fever soon after giving birth. According to &line (1975), the death 
rate at various times around 1846-47 ranged from about 18 percent 
in Paris, 26 percent in Berlin, 32 percent in Turin, to about 40 percent 
in Vienna (p. 57). A doctor named Semmelweis discovered the cause 
of many of these deaths and also devised the means to prevent them. 
But his discoveries were vehemently rejected by the peer review 
authorities of the day on an international level. He was fired from 
his job at the university, apparently as a direct result of the 
embarrassment that his discoveries caused among the peer review 
authorities. Many years and deaths later, i t  was finally recognized 
that Semmelweis was right, and long after his death a monument 
was dedicated to him in Budapest. Ciline describes the opposition 
to Semmelweis’s discoveries by peer review authorities as intellectually 
blind, mendacious, stupid, and evil (p. 74). How many women suffered 
and died because of the nonscholarly suppressive reactions of these 
peer review authorities? 
Suarez and Lemoine (1986) discuss a somewhat similar case of 
academic and intellectual suppression, namely, the opposition of peer 
review authorities to the findings of Beauperthuy that yellow fever 
was spread by means of insectile transmission. Based on their account, 
i t  seems obvious that Beauperthuy hit a raw nerve among some of 
the medical research leaders of the day. Although Beauperthuy 
managed to publish some of his findings, they were apparently 
ignored during his lifetime and then attacked vigorously after his 
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death in 1871. Moreover, i t  seems that there is, in this case, a 
documented example of how such intellectual suppression on the 
part of peer review authorities can lead directly to de facto academic 
library censorship inasmuch as the 1895 bibliography of the medical 
school at the University of Caracas, according to Suarez and Lemoine, 
did not mention Beauperthuy nor his works. Around 1900, the United 
States Yellow Fever Commission validated Beauperthuy’s findings. 
But how many people suffered and died in this case because peer 
review authorities of the day suppressed an innovative scholarly idea? 
Suarez and Lemoine describe their lengthy article as “an example 
of how the processes of academic resistance to new findings evolve” 
(pp. 383-410). 
It is not necessary, however, to look back a century or so for 
examples of peer review suppression. In the by now infamous Cell-
Baltimore case, Walter Stewart and Ned Feder, scientists at the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), wrote (personal communication, 
May 20, 1987) that senior officials at NIH had forbidden them to 
submit a rebuttal article to a scholarly journal. In a letter sent by 
Moran on June 9, 1987, the Director of NIH, James Wyngaarden 
was asked: “If scientists either within or outside NIH uncover 
inaccurate material in research supported by NIH funds, or if such 
scientists come up with hypotheses which contest the results of such 
research,...would NIH in any way stifle the publication of such 
opposing views?” In a letter of September 25, 1987, written on behalf 
of the director by another NIH official, Mary Miers, the following 
answer is tendered: “I cannot envison a situation in which NIH would 
seek to suppress a rebuttal article ....” Yet Miers had received a copy 
of an NIH memorandum to Feder and Stewart on December 12, 1986 
and signed by another NIH official, J. E. Rall, in which the following 
is written: “I am withholding approval of your manuscript for 
publication....” Moreover, in a letter of April 2, 1987, the same Rall 
wrote Baltimore, whose article was being rebutted by the Feder- 
Stewart piece: “Meanwhile, I have told Feder and Stewart that their 
manuscript cannot be submitted to a journal ....” Rall also wrote to 
Moran on December 15, 1986: “It is clearly not NIH policy to 
discourage or indeed otherwise suppress publication of hscussions 
and corrections of errors....” Apparently i t  took about a year, and 
help from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), to have this 
decision reversed. The article by Feder and Stewart was then finally 
submitted to several journals but  was rejected by them. A 
Congressional investigation ensued, which turned out to be very 
embarrassing for the NIH leadership (Greenberg, 1988, pp. 1-6). 
Recently, three scientists, Sprague (1987), Hollis (1987), and 
Jacobstein (1987), related how retaliation was launched against them 
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when they uncovered information of a scientific nature that upset 
academic authorities. At the University of Pittsburgh, Breuning 
engaged in erroneous research and was later charged with fraud 
(Greenberg, 1988, p. 5 ) .  After exposing Breuning’s error, Sprague 
describes how his own research funding was “deferred” and “stopped 
for four months” (p. 12). Hollis (1987) recounts how “superiors” 
at Case Western Reserve University “made it  clear” to him that he 
“would pay dearly” for his discoveries that had so upset academic 
authorities (p. 11). Jacobstein (1987) comments that his “own 
experience [at Cornell University] suggests that i t  is nearly impossible 
to get a fair investigation of the facts ...” when a scholar comes up 
with unsettling findings (p. 11). Additionally, Martin (1989) has 
recently reported on three cases of suppression by peer review 
authorities in Australia. He describes the reactions against scholars 
who uncovered information that was upsetting to academic 
authorities: “Many colleagues who tried to present the allegations 
encountered difficulties. Jim Rossiter received hundreds of 
threatening phone calls after he persisted with his allegations in 
the Briggs case. The careers of Vardy and French at Foundation 41 
suffered when they raised the issue of McBride’s fraud” (p. 101). 
In the wake of the Breuning scandal at the University of 
Pittsburgh, another scholar is apparently having a difficult time after 
he attempted to publish a “dissenting” article. Despite all the rhetoric 
about academic freedom that flows in speeches on campuses and 
throughout the literature of higher education, i t  seems that Cantekin’s 
submission of a dissenting point of view to a journal was regarded 
by some academic authorities as “unauthorized” and, as such, was 
considered “improper and a source of grave academic concern.” 
Randal (1989) comments on some peer review aspects of the case: 
At the same time, the university’s actions have come under fire. At last 
fall’s congressional hearing, for example, Weiss said of medical school 
officials, “They have now achieved what they want to do. They have 
shut up Dr. Cantekin. They’ve stopped him from doing any research, 
and he can’t publish his information because they have intimidated the 
journals as to what they can or cannot print.” (p.9) 
Peer review suppression occurs in reference works as well. One 
possible effect of such suppression is that scholarly errors are 
perpetuated. In turn, a consequential effect is that reference librarians 
and scholars might end up getting hoodwinked. Altick (1974) 
comments on this situation: “Unless the persons responsible for new 
editions of standard works are tenaciously abreast of developments 
in scholarship, there is always the danger that statements once 
accepted as truth, but now discredited, will persist without 
amendment” (p. 15). The Lexicon of the Middle Ages claims that: 
“Its primary aim is absolutely reliable information ....” Further, its 
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promotional literature (or literature with information for scholars, 
whichever the case may be), clearly states: “In the case of controversial 
problems and theories the L e x i c o n  also gives the protagonists of 
opposing positions a chance to express their views ....” A controversy 
that has been called “the case of the century” has been going on 
for several years in studies of art of the Middle Ages. Over f i f ty  specific 
issues have been raised by the present authors in the debate as evidence 
that the highly cherished and traltional views on the subject are 
clamorously wrong (as might be expected-in view of the examples 
of peer review suppression cited earlier-it has been difficult to get 
these f i f ty  or so issues published in the so-called core literature). 
A request was made to some of the editorial leaders of the Lexicon 
to allow the protagonists to express their views in the journal’s pages. 
Along with the request was included a reminder of the editors’ claim 
that all sides of a controversy could be found in the pages. 
Nevertheless, the request was flatly denied, in large part on the basis 
that the journal does not have room for dissenting views on the subject 
and also on the basis that the knowledge of one of the editors indicates 
that the traditional view is the prevailing view in the scholarly 
literature (documentation and discussion for this case is scheduled 
for publication in a future issue of The Reference Librar ian) .  
SCHOLARLY AND SELECTIONCONTROVERSIES 
OF MATERIAL LIBRARIESFOR ACADEMIC 
By their very nature, scholarly controversies are of ten situations 
in which scholars disagree about what the truth is in a given subject 
or study. Sometimes the disagreements are narrowly defined by fine 
points that are comprehensible to, and considered significant by, a 
relatively small group of specialists. But other controversies, 
illustrated by the Semmelweis and Beauperthuy cases among others, 
involve wide disagreements about issues that are in fact matters of 
life and death. 
It would seem that the very existence of scholarly controversies 
have created some ethical problems for academic libaries regarding 
the selection of materials for their collections. In general terms, it 
would seem logical that selection would be based on what the scholars 
at the university (college, research center) need and want, and also 
on an intrinsic priority of material that contains the truth over 
material that contains falsehoods masquerading as truths (if such 
distinctions can be detected at the time). But what if some scholars 
do not want the truth to be known regarding a specific subject? Such 
a situation is implicit in at least some, if not many, scholarly 
controversies, and i t  is also implicit in some of the peer review 
suppression cases cited earlier. And what should the academic 
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librarian select if some of these scholars who do not want some specific 
truths to be known have powerful positions in the university? 
It seems that there are two likely responses to the question of 
what should be selected for the academic library in the case of 
controversies: either all sides of the question or only the information 
that the peer review authorities sanction. Davis (1982, p. 40)regards 
access to all sides of a question as a librarian’s duty. Sanford Berman 
(personal communication to I. Hueck of the Kunsthistorisches 
Institut, Firenze, Italy, September 12, 1986) goes even further in his 
description of how the Guido Riccio controversy in art history should 
be handled by art research libraries specializing in Italian art: 
Good library procedure would dictate-with respect to a major 
intellectual and academic dispute like that surroundmg Guido Riccio- 
that extra measures to be taken to IDENTIFY AND MAKE AVAILABLE 
T H E  ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF VIEWPOINTS AND DOCU-
MENTATION....Beyond that, given the unquestionable interest in this 
particular matter, a proactive, truly helpful and alert librarian would 
also prepare-and possibly duplicate for broad distribution-a special 
bibliography on the case. Such a resource-list should be posted 
prominently in the library and updated frequently. In addition, it should 
be published in an appropriate art journal, in order that all interested 
scholars, historians, and others have the opportunity to fully and 
dispassionately investigate the dispute and reach their own, informed 
conclusions. 
Berman also writes that he is “frankly appalled and disgusted-as 
a professional librarian committed to basic tenets of intellectual and 
academic freedom-by the transparent censorship conducted at the 
Institut Library ...” (see the article by John Swan in this issue of 
Library Trends). 
Sowards (personal communication, February 23, 1989) also 
believes that the goal of an academic library collection “is to present 
the fullest possible range of opinion and information,” and he states 
there are two ways to attain this, “first, to tap the judgements of 
the recognized experts within a field as aids to selection, and second, 
to make a place for dissenters in the collection ....” On the other 
hand, Osburn (1989) is of the opinion that academic librarians should 
follow, and carry out by means of selection, the wishes of the so-
called peer review authorities. In any case, it would seem that the 
two responses are in conflict on ethical grounds. 
PEERREVIEWAUTHORITIESAND 
ACADEMICWHISTLE-BLOWERS 
Peer review authorities are generally regarded as members of 
the academic community who have the power to decide what gets 
published in the university presses (and other major scholarly 
publishing houses), what appears in the prestigious scholarly 
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journals, who receives grants for research, and who receives 
professional promotion. To some extent, they are also the authors 
of the texts that comprise the so-called core literature in their fields 
and also that comprise some of the ideas and material taught in 
classrooms. They are also often editors, authors, and members of 
advisory boards of specialized reference works in their academic 
disciplines. In short, peer review authorities are regarded as being 
the leading experts in their fields. 
Academic whistle-blowers are commonly perceived as scholars 
who feel they have made discoveries, or come up with findings, that 
contradict and contest scholarly ideas, facts, and information that 
have been accepted as true, valid, and reliable. As scholars seeking 
the truth, whistle-blowers can feel obligated to make these new ideas 
known within the scholarly communication system (in this sense, 
Semmelweis and Beauperthuy were classic examples of academic 
whistle-blowers). It is obvious that the hscoveries and findings of 
the whistle-blower might well contest some deeply ingrained and 
highly cherished traditional beliefs in academia, and also contradict- 
and prove wrong-some of the pet theories and ideas of the peer 
review authorities. Such a situation can obviously create tension and 
animosity to say the least. It seems natural that an adversarial situation 
might develop, with the peer review authorities possessing the power 
to suppress the new ideas insofar as the core literature is concerned. 
Peer review suppression can be vicious and determined, as illustrated 
by some of the cases cited earlier. Such suppression can also include 
the use of intimidation and retaliation as well as censorship of the 
ideas themselves. In a text entitled Academia, Journdism and Politics 
(in press), Lang writes: 
There are strong forces which inhibit criticism, from within or without. 
One of these forces is “collegiality” ....There are other forces of 
intimidation, of various kinds ....Some influential academics are giving 
priority to protecting their tribe; they close ranks behind each other...and 
they obstruct, in so far as they can, criticisms of “their own” ....There 
are pressures to shut people up: social pressures, use of bylaws, use of 
the pecking order, intimidation, etc .... 
A recent example of censorship was that on January 29, 1990, 
the editor of a scholarly publication wrote the present authors: “I 
hope that I can tell you one day what happened to me, after I have 
published your article” (for the time being, it might be better not 
to reveal the identity of this person lest more retaliation take place). 
Some time ago, the managing editor of Viator (the scholarly journal 
of the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at UCLA), actually 
returned material to a scholar without even opening the envelope 
(the unopened envelope was enclosed by the managing editor inside 
a larger envelope and then sent back to the scholar). 
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ACADEMIC REACTIONSLIBRARIAN 
TO ACADEMICSUPPRESSION 
What should academic librarians do in the face of academic 
suppression once the suppression is pointed out to them? As an ethical 
matter, potential answers to the question can create conflicts regarding 
the concepts of academic freedom and patrons who the academic 
library “serves” within the university, college, or research center. On 
the other hand, students and their families pay tuition and other 
fees to attend a university and to “get an education.” There is no 
question that the library should serve them. If students go to a library 
in search of information, i t  is natural for them to assume that 
librarians are trying to help them find information that is true, 
reliable, and accurate (at least in nations that purport to have open 
democratic societies and governments). At the same time, faculty 
members enjoy academic freedom, which allows them to choose the 
subject matter for their courses. 
Suppose, in a hypothetical situation, that a faculty member 
requests that the librarian set up  a reserve shelf for a course. Then, 
while the course is in progress, the library receives a gift of a book, 
or an off-print that contests and disproves some of the material that 
the faculty member has chosen for the reserve shelf. In this case, 
should the librarian provide the students access to this relevant 
information? Or does the concept of academic freedom take precedence 
even to the extent that contested and possibly untrue information 
be allowed to reign in the library as well as in the classroom? Does 
academic freedom in a case such as this impede the academic librarian 
from giving students access to information and ideas of the widest 
range relating to all sides of an academic question? 
It seems that similar ethical conflicts exist currently on a broader 
scale in relation to scholarly communication. On the one hand, the 
ethical principle that librarians should give access to the widest range 
of ideas and information would indicate that librarians should react 
negatively to academic suppression and censorship the way librarians 
react negatively with rhetorical word and zealous deed to censorship 
proposed (or actually instituted) by government leaders or agencies 
or by religious leaders (e.g., the Moral Majority). And, to be sure, 
who is in the position of power to, in a large part, effect suppression 
and censorship of academic material if not the peer review authorities? 
The government has also been known to try to suppress 
“sensitive” scientific information. Nonetheless, Charles Osburn (1989) 
apparently firmly opposes having academic librarians make a place 
for academic whistle-blowers if peer review authorities do not include 
these whistle-blowers in the so-called core literature. Apparently 
speaking for some academic librarians, he writes, “we have discovered 
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our place in what is now called the scholarly communication 
system....The relative importance of a given output of scholarly 
communication is determined through its acceptance or rejection by 
the peer review authority in each field” (pp. 277, 281). Osburn also 
refers to an overloaded information system that contains “noise” (p. 
285). If “noise” in this case refers in any way to the ideas that peer 
review authorities reject, perhaps the question can be raised about 
whether the “noise” created by Semmelweis and Beauperthuy 
drowned out, from academic librarian ears, the cries of pain and 
suffering of the victims of childbirth fever and yellow fever. 
Osburn was questioned about his views, specifically those 
regarding whether or not errors made by peer review authorities 
should be corrected. In his reply (personal communication, October 
31, 1989), he stated that errors should be corrected, but only by the 
peer review authorities themselves. Therefore, it would seem that, 
according to Osburn, if peer review authorities do not correct their 
own errors, or if their peer review colleagues do not correct their 
errors for them, the academic librarian should let the erroneous 
material (masquerading as truth) stand, even if more accurate (and 
therefore more truthful) material on the same subject arrives in the 
library but via nonpeer review authority channels. In his letter, he 
writes: 
For an item of communication to be entered into the formal system, 
it is reviewed first by duciplinary peers ....The library does not and should 
not lead the system of scholarly communication ....I believe that the flaws 
of the system should be corrected directly. Changing the role of the library 
in the scholarly communication system will not accomplish that at all: 
moreover, such actions would merely serve as another, larger corruption, 
rendering the system of scholarly communication incomprehensible and 
very incoherent. 
In essence, Osburn states that since academic librarians cannot 
collect everything and therefore must be selective, their selections 
should be based on what the peer review authorities deem most 
important and significant. This view certainly has some useful and 
practical aspects to it, since the authorities usually have more expertise 
on specific subjects than librarians do. On the other hand, i t  is difficult 
to understand how, if an academic librarian at the University of 
Vienna a century or so ago had placed Semmelweis’s findings on 
the shelves and in the bibliographies, or i f  academic librarians at 
Paris and Caracas had provided access to Beauperthuy’s works, such 
actions could be part of “another larger corruption, rendering the 
system of scholarly communication incomprehensible and very 
incoherent.” Nor is i t  easy to understand how Osburn’s views apply 
to an academic librarian who has recently requested a large amount 
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of nonpeer review material relating to the Guido Riccio controversy 
for the library collection. 
A defect in Osburn’s proposed scholarly communication system 
might be that it does not sufficiently acknowledge that the history 
of science and other fields, to a large degree, constitute a history 
of academic whistle-blowing. Schneider (1989) writes: “If the 
knowledge expounded by recognized scholars to their students should 
prove to be of dubious reliability, then their authority is open to 
question. Thus, scientific progress and changing theories are natural 
enemies of authoritarian tradition” (p. 137). Schneider’s observations 
place in sharp relief what is perhaps the biggest flaw in Osburn’s 
“system,” namely, that he is proposing that academic librarians select 
materials more on the basis of authority than on the truth that the 
material contains. Insofar as librarians follow the advice of authorities 
to make selection in the first place, Osburn’s views have merit. But 
when he insists that academic librarians should exclude the works 
of academic whistle-blowers from their collections until the 
authorities themselves allow such works into the core literature on 
the subject, then Osburn’s system seems more appropriate for 
totalitarianism. Along this line of reasoning, Swan and Peattie (1989) 
write: “access to the broadest range of ideas and information is 
conducive to the practice of democracy. This means that denying 
such access is an action that should be sharply questioned” (p. 120). 
Religious authorities punished Galileo and other scientists whose 
ideas did not jibe with authoritative doctrine, and they went on to 
suppress their ideas. What academic peer review authorities did to 
Semmelweis, Beauperthuy, and other whistle-blowers might be 
considered an  academic’s form of similar punishment and 
suppression. And if academic librarians carry out the peer review 
authorities’ suppression on library shelves and bibliographies, then 
it seems that Osburn’s system might be more accurately defined as 
a “system of scholarly excommunication,” with “out-of-cite, out-of- 
mind” procedures that suppress ideas that are “excommunicated” 
in terms of the peer review authority dogma. 
ACADEMIC AND ACADEMICLIBRARIANS WHISTLE-BLOWERS 
Without giving up  their neutrality, academic librarians can 
consider both whistle-blowers and peer review authorities as their 
allies. Academic authorities are allies by providing expertise as a guide 
for selection. Whistle-blowers are natural allies to the extent that 
they provide material that makes corrections and provides new ideas 
that the authorities overlooked or tried to suppress. 
In any case, the attitude of the academic librarian toward the 
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whistle-blower reflects to a large extent the librarian’s attitude toward 
truth and censorship. Oboler (1982) takes a firm stand against 
censorship: “Among the many important tasks to be performed by 
the librarian-by the professon of librarianship-not the least is that 
of perpetual, unceasing awareness of and combat against censorship 
on every level, of every type, whenever and wherever it occurs” (p. 
99). He does not seem to be the kind of person who would censor 
the works of Semmelweis, Beauperthuy, or other academic 
whistleblowers. Not all academic librarians take so strong a stand, 
however. In requests for information that dealt with gifts that 
contained material upsetting to authorities in academia, Margreet 
Wijnstroom (at that time the secretary general of IFLA) wrote: “I 
would suggest you let the matter rest, and in any case cease to bother 
the members of my Executive Board and my staff with matters beyond 
their control” (personal communication, December 10, 1986). 
ACADEMIC LIBRARIANS, ASSOCIATIONS,LIBRARIES, LIBRARY 
AND INTELLECTUALFREEDOM A PROPOSALCOMMITTEES: 
If a government official (Meese for one and Joseph McCarthy 
for another) issues a call for a clean-up against pornography, immoral 
literature, or subversive material, there is a natural feeling among 
librarians that they are being asked to do things that run counter 
to their professional ethics, as a sampling of the rhetoric against 
the Meese Report at ALA meetings confirms. Although there was 
effective suppression during the so-called McCarthy era, nowadays 
intellectual freedom groups and associations at various professional 
levels can be quick in cranking u p  their rhetoric and activity to protest 
such suppressive moves as part of the librarian’s anti-censorship ethic. 
Rightly so, at least for librarians who believe in fighting censorship 
“on every level, of every type, whenever and wherever i t  occurs.” 
On the other hand, i t  seems that if peer review authorities suppress 
material that purports to correct error in the core literature, some 
academic librarians apparently regard the suppressed material as 
“noise” that does not belong in the library in the first place. Swan 
(personal communication, December 12, 1989) writes, “it may be 
significant that the ACRL has no Division IFC, and there is nothing 
explicitly related to ethics or intellectual freedom in its goals.” This 
situation seems to indicate that there might be something amiss, 
or misdirected, about the word intellectual, as used by some librarians 
or in the use of the term “intellectual freedom.” In other words, 
there are IF groups set u p  and established for various library 
associations at various levels, but apparently not specifically for 
academic library groups. Smut peddlers can turn to specific IF library 
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groups for assistance when their wares are censored, but what special 
committees can scholars turn to when their discoveries, findings, and 
ideas are censored? 
A proposal for academic library groups to establish IF committees 
is not necessarily a question of trying to second guess the peer review 
authorities about what the truth of the subject matter is in specific 
cases. Rather, it is more a question of whether academic librarians 
are really committed to providing accurate information, to fighting 
censorship, to “insuring that the widest range of information and 
ideas possible are available.” It also involves the question of whether 
or not academic librarians will look the other way when bona fide 
scholars, after a long time of routinely using a library, are suddenly 
denied permission to study there solely because the scholars published 
articles of which peer review authorities do not approve. (If a person 
were denied permission to use a library based on race, religious, or 
sexual preferences, what would the IF reactions of various 
anticensorship librarians be?) IF groups for academic library 
committees would be a part of the academic librarian’s effort to help 
scholars attempt to determine what the truth is in their given studies. 
Neither would there be a need for academic librarians to suddenly 
become experts and specialists in academic disciplines, nor would 
it mean that peer review rejections are the equivalent of censorship. 
In some cases, if not many, librarians themselves can detect 
academic and intellectual suppression and censorship of a blatant 
sort by the very nature of the peer review rejections and by the attitudes 
of some peer review authorities toward the truth. A few examples 
can help illustrate the point. In a rejection letter (December 9, 1987), 
Ethan Shevrach, editor in chief of the Journal ofzmmunology, wrote: 
“Whether or not your interpretation of the data is correct or not 
is irrelevant.” The article in question was a rebuttal that purported 
to expose, if not correct, an alleged serious error in the core literature 
recently published in the field. If the correctness of the interpretation 
of the data is “irrelevant,” it would logically follow that Shevrach 
does not really feel too strongly about whether the interpretation 
in the published article is correct either. Moreover, the rejected article 
was one that NIH authorities had originally denied permission to 
be submitted for publication, though subsequently the American 
Civil Liberties Union finally intervened. But that is not all. The 
same rebuttal article provoked the following negative reaction from 
Patricia Woolf (personal communication, July 23, 1987): “It is 
uncomfortable to live with error but important to remember that 
correcting a specific error at the expense of collegial trust will not 
and cannot restore that comfort.” (Woolf’s ideas certainly would have 
brought comfort and joy to the peer review authorities who did not 
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wish to have their errors corrected, with ensuing loss of collegial 
trust, by Semmelweis and Beauperthuy. But what is more “un-
comfortable” to Woolf, the discomfort of scholars who have to bear 
the pain of having their scholarly mistakes corrected or the intense 
pain of the many persons who suffered and died because scholarly 
error was not corrected?) It would seem that rejections based on 
reasoning that accuracy is irrelevant or that collegial trust should 
take priority over correction of error, can serve as warning signs to 
academic librarians that academic censorship might be taking place. 
In addition, there may be other telling signals. Suppose peer 
review authorities return material without opening it  or refuse to 
acknowledge receipt of a manuscript submitted for publication? 
Likewise, Catch 22 type rejections might raise an eyebrow among 
anticensorship minded librarians, as well as rejections listed by Remus 
(1980) such as the following: “The referee criticizes the paper for 
vices i t  does not have, and suggests i t  not be published” (p. 88). 
There are also evasive and stonewalling tactics of peer review 
authorities that can be telling. For example, in a situation paralleling 
one experienced by the present authors, a paper is submitted. A 
reviewer requests some changes, but neither the editor nor the reviewer 
tell the authors precisely what changes are required. The authors 
write asking for clarification, but neither the editor nor the reviewer 
nor even the President/Chancellor of the university who is on the 
editorial board ex officio, answer these repeated requests. Finally, 
after the stonewalling becomes glaringly obvious, an assistant to the 
President/Chancellor informs the authors that they are responsible 
for the delays because they did not make the required corrections 
in the manuscript. Once again, there is no indication of what these 
corrections should be. In the face of this situation, Serebnick’s opinion 
comes to mind: “I do not feel that the editor has an ethical duty 
to tell the authors what the referee recommended” (personal 
communication, August 20, 1989). (The original context of the quote 
by Serebnick was a case in which the referee suggested publication 
of the article, but the editor turned around and rejected it  outright 
without informing the authors of the referee’s judgment. At any rate, 
i t  is obvious that if authors are not informed of corrections that 
they should make in the text, an article can be suppressed forever 
without the editor ever having to write a rejection letter.) 
None of this discussion about shady peer review tactics means 
that academic librarians should intervene or try to overturn unfair 
and suppressive peer review decisions. But knowledge of such 
situations might help the librarian realize that the ideas and 
information rejected by peer review leaders might be more than mere 
“noise” if such ideas show up eventually in noncore publications. 
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It is difficult to imagine, on ethical grounds, objections and 
opposition to the establishment of IF groups for the ACRL and other 
academic library associations. To the contrary, such IF committees 
would reinforce and enhance the academic librarian’s commitment 
to truth and to providing access to the widest range of ideas, especially 
in the case of controversies. While not setting themselves up as arbiters 
of the truth, librarians can serve more effectively as illuminators of 
the truth in service of scholars seeking the truth. Besides, the very 
establishment of such IF committees, with their statements of 
anticensorship goals, principles, and objectives, might have a salutary 
effect on the quality of peer review in academia. Such IF groups 
might also have a positive effect on tolerance for new and truthful 
ideas in academia that are in contrast to older and false, but highly 
cherished, ideas. 
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